Stable U.S.-China economic and trade ties are a vital global public good

2026-09-30 Source :People's Daily By :

Economic and trade cooperation has long served as the ballast and propeller of U.S.-China relations. Keeping it steady benefits both countries; moreover, it is a vital global public good. When the world's two largest economies trade and invest with confidence, the benefits ripple outward through global growth, financial markets, and supply chains. When they do not, everyone pays.

Personal diplomacy matters when distrust makes contact politically costly. That is why President Xi Jinping's state visit to Washington and his summit with President Donald Trump matter well beyond the headlines. Face-to-face diplomacy between the two heads of state is an irreplaceable strategic anchor. It reduces the risk of miscalculation, builds a measure of trust, broadens cooperation, manages disagreement, and gives officials, professionals, scholars, and companies clear direction for working with their counterparts to solve problems without appearing to concede national interests.

A presidential understanding is most valuable when it empowers institutions to do work that personal relationships can only initiate. Such signals lower the political cost of advocating cooperation and raise the cost of gratuitous hostility. And when citizens see their leaders engage in respectful, rational dialogue, it helps defuse toxic nationalism and shows that structural rivals can coexist within an efficacious framework.

The business community needs this. According to the U.S.-China Business Council, 95 percent of American companies consider their China operations important to their global competitiveness, and 92 percent were profitable there last year. Yet only about half plan new investment. Profitability, in other words, is not the binding constraint; uncertainty is. Respondents again ranked U.S.-China relations as their greatest challenge.

The task now is to convert summit goodwill into predictable, durable institutions, and a start has been made. The two sides agreed on more favorable tariff treatment for $30 billion of nonsensitive goods in each direction, to be managed through their Board of Trade, and established a Board of Investment to address opportunities and impediments. Mechanisms like these, covering tariffs, market access, and equal national treatment, are what turn episodic goodwill into stable expectations. And when expectations are stable, engagement generates its own momentum.

The foundation for such institutions already exists, because the two economies are complementary. Energy is an obvious example. China's commitment to import at least 10 million metric tons of American coal in 2027 and 2028, along with renewed Chinese interest in long-term U.S. liquefied natural gas contracts, helps China diversify supply and strengthen energy security while supporting American exports and narrowing the trade imbalance. Cross-border investment works similarly, cultivating a broad constituency of stakeholders on both sides. Diplomacy opens doors; sustained commercial participation makes cooperation take root. Mutual benefit is not a byproduct of the relationship. It is its foundation.

None of this makes implementation easy. Building “a constructive U.S.-China relationship of strategic stability,” as the operational phrase goes, still faces well-known hurdles on both sides. In such moments, clear direction from both presidents is essential to remove bottlenecks and keep commitments on track.

What does not survive scrutiny is the rhetoric of "decoupling and severing supply chains," which runs counter to both economic logic and objective reality. Capital, technology, and production networks are now so tightly interwoven that pulling them apart would cause severe damage: higher costs, fractured industrial chains, and losses for businesses and consumers on both sides of the Pacific. China's competitive strength in green and new energy technologies is already integral to global supply systems. Over time, market realities will outweigh ideological narratives.

Artificial intelligence raises a different, more urgent problem. Washington and Beijing will compete over models, chips, and applications; neither should expect the other to surrender its technological ambitions. Yet a serious AI incident affecting critical infrastructure or national security, whether by rogue AI agents or malevolent non-state actors, could be devastating. AI exemplifies how competition and cooperation can coexist. The United States and China, the two leading AI powers by far, must separate risk management from that competition. The summit's agreement to launch a U.S.-China "Super Intelligence" dialogue on AI's risks and benefits, together with a bilateral channel for AI-related incidents, is a modest but meaningful first step, one that could inform shared safety standards and, eventually, global AI governance. Guardrails agreed between rivals are especially credible.

People-to-people exchange provides further ballast. Youth exchanges cannot reverse strategic rivalry, but they can change the social environment in which rivalry incubates and operates. President Xi's invitation for 100,000 young Americans to visit China for exchange and study over the next five years builds reservoirs of goodwill and counters the echo chamber of hawkish rhetoric. Broader exchanges in education, health, culture, and think tanks can empower current policymakers and cultivate future ones so that firsthand experience replaces ideological caricature. Such engagement and exploration are now ratified by the two leaders.

No single summit can resolve deep structural differences, but this summit has set a constructive tone. By managing differences responsibly and expanding cooperation, the United States and China can reinforce multilateral trading and financial systems, tackle transnational challenges together, and give countries everywhere the predictability to plan with confidence. By converting presidential commitment into institutional durability, it will send the world a powerful message: the two major powers can compete and still cooperate, thereby preserving constructive conditions for shared global prosperity.

Editor:董泽坤